Jim Kelley

Jim Kelley writes regularly on the NHL for Sportsnet.ca and can be heard on Primetime Sports on the FAN590.

Scott Gomez is an example of a desperation signing by ex-GM Bob Gainey under the new NHL salary cap.

Before we enter the cauldron of Olympic hockey expectations (and the inevitable chest thumping and teeth gnashing that it brings forth) there is one issue left from last week that needs to be addressed.

The view from here is that the question shouldn't be whether or not Bob Gainey was asked to leave or told ownership he intended to do so - a kinder, gentler way of putting forth the old "pushed" or "jumped" argument. It should be: how did one of the most admired and respected general managers in the National Hockey League find himself in the position of stepping aside in season.

Though I lean toward the argument that the former Montreal Canadiens's boss sized up his work and, coupled with where he was in both his personal and professional life, decided to write his own exit strategy rather than have one imposed upon him, it only serves to obscure the bigger issue.

The more important topic should be a debate as to whether or not a system designed by National Hockey League Commissioner Gary Bettman was subverted by Gainey's ex colleagues, the majority of NHL general managers.

It's an argument that is not provable, but it does fit the conception of probable.

Consider:

Coming out of the lockout and what was perceived as an across-the-board victory for Bettman regarding imposing both the idea of a salary cap system and how it would work over time, the GMs threw him the kind of curve one tends to see in a stick that gets buried in the back hall come crunch time in a game or during overtime and the shootout.

In the commissioner's world contracts coming off the resumption of play in 2005 would be largely short term and that, over time, there would be an expanded pool of free agents flooding the market. With GMs having the ability to pick and choose from an oversized pool, the price for a free agent with noteworthy skills would actually drop. It was a nod to the economic rule of supply and demand, an oversupply of available talent in the workforce would drive down the prices simply because there would be more than a handful of players in demand.

Several GMs, Gainey seemingly among them, bought into the Bettman model and planned accordingly. Gainey was bolder than most , eventually positioning his team so that it had 10 free agents poised to hit the open market at the same time. Though many in the game, especially in media, thought that bordered on a thin line between chaos and disaster, Gainey seemed to see an opportunity, a chance to revamp a lineup that had performed well, but not well enough to win a championship. He saw a revamp that would be made possible by selecting from a huge pool of free agents from other teams and with price points that would allow the Canadiens, who can usually spend to the cap, to retool and upgrade at the same time.

But along the way things took a decidedly different turn. GMs like then Edmonton boss Kevin Lowe (and a few others) started making bids on restricted free agents, the youthful players that had heretofore been unspoken untouchables for GMs. In response, GMs started signing their younger players, players who showed promise at the NHL but had yet to accomplish anything, to big-money contracts and for surprisingly long terms.

The "lock them up" mentality took hold. Short term deals went by the boards and five and six year deals, deals that paid a premium for players who were willing to give up an early year or two of their impending free agency, became the norm. Bettman, who normally gives the GMs a certain amount of discretion even when he disagrees with their overall philosophy, was noticeably upset. In a series of comments, including an exceptionally strong rebuke of the GMs during a public forum in Nashville, the Commissioner went on record as saying the GMs had taken a path that he wouldn't have chosen. He also said it would - in words other than these - come back to bite them.

But it was more than a word game, there were consequences to those who had followed the initial concept and then became victims of what the majority had done. Gainey, missing the trend altogether, was at the head of the list.

His team, which had been on an upward cycle, a unit that in 2007-08 was the best in the Eastern Conference, started to spiral downward. In the 2008 playoffs they weren't what they appeared to be in the regular season (surely their youth and youthful goaltending played a role in that) and last spring they barely qualified for the postseason before falling to the Boston Bruins in a performance that wasn't even competitive.

Gainey had made other mistakes, but they paled in comparison to the fact that this past offseason he had 10 unrestricted free agents, the majority of whom he couldn't re-sign even if he wanted to or the fan base there would let him. Worse, the anticipated big pool of reasonably young (and reasonably priced) had been constricted by the GMs who locked up their young players. For better or worse, most clubs had locked down the bulk of what was supposed to be a large pool of youthful free agents. Gainey was left with a pool of players most teams simply didn't want or couldn't afford. It created a market that was small enough that he had to engage in bidding to pay top-line money for players who hadn't performed at the top levels.

The result, a mostly undersized lineup with some name but underachieving players - former New Jersey Devils center Scott Gomez being the poster-boy example - joined others like Brian Gionta and Mike Cammalleri who got big money and long term deals in part because Gainey was desperate for players and the pool was disappointingly small.

As a result, the Canadiens are in salary cap hell for this season and the foreseeable future. Not a good place for a GM to be with new ownership - and ownership that unlike the Tampa Bay Lighting and some other fiscally challenged clubs - knows its way around the National Hockey League.

Surely the Molson family wasn't happy with that and with Gainey's contract nearing its end, well, one could argue that - one way or another - his stepping down was inevitable.

That he got to do it his way is fine. He's served hockey and the Canadiens long enough and well enough to deserve to write his own exit play.

But that doesn't obscure the fact that he followed a path that the NHL championed and that the NHL general managers scuttled. In misreading those markers both Gainey and the Montreal Canadians are paying a heavy price.